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We give an achievable secret key rate of a binary modulated continuous variable quantum key
distribution schemes in the collective attack scenario considering quantum channels that impose
arbitrary noise on the exchanged signals. Bob performs homodyne measurements on the received
states and the two honest parties employ a reverse reconciliation procedure in the classical post-
processing step of the protocol.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a way to establish
a key between two communicating parties, traditionally
called Alice and Bob, which is provable secure against
any eavesdropping strategy of an technologically unlim-
ited third party Eve. In principle, Alice and Bob can
achieve this goal by exchanging nonorthogonal quantum
states as signals and using non-commuting measurements
on the receiver side. Any eavesdropper needs to interact
with these quantum signals to gain information about
the sent signal. This inevitably causes a disturbance of
the signals and leads to errors in the data that Alice and
Bob observe. If the amount of errors lies below a cer-
tain threshold, Alice and Bob proceed by post-processing
their data: they correct for errors and employ privacy
amplification to cut out any residual information that
Eve might have with the raw key. In this article, we
give a lower bound to the secret key rate of a continuous
variable (CV) QKD scheme [1, 2, 3, 4] employing homo-
dyne detection in the collective attack scenario. As the
outcomes of Bob’s measurement are continuous, it is con-
venient to characterize Eve’s interference with the signal
states by the first and second moments of Bob’s mea-
surement outcomes. These parameters are usually given
in terms of the observed loss and the excess noise of the
quantum channel connecting Alice and Bob. The proof
technique presented here can be used to compute secret
key rates of a binary modulated CV-QKD scheme for ar-
bitrary, in particular non-Gaussian observations, thereby
extending the results given in [3]. This is important from
a conceptual point of view, as the optimality of Gaussian
attacks [5, 6] has only been shown for CV-schemes us-
ing a Gaussian modulated set of coherent states as input
[4, 7, 8]. So far, the security of the binary scheme is not
fully established yet, even if one limits the eavesdrop-
per to collective attacks. Our analysis presented here is
restricted to the asymptotic key limit as the number of
exchanged signals n approaches infinity.
We consider the class of collective attacks [9, 10],
thereby limiting Eve’s possible interaction with the sig-
nal states. In this scenario, Eve can only interact with
each signal individually, but she can store these quantum
states for later usage. In the classical post-processing
phase, Alice and Bob exchange information about their
shared bit strings over a authenticated classical channel.
This information eventually leaks to Eve, who can make
use of this additional knowledge to employ optimized
measurement on her quantum states. Our starting point
of the security estimation presented here is to assume
that the quantum state effectively shared by Alice, Bob
and Eve, is of product form ρ⊗nABE . In contrast to that,
the most general coherent attacks can introduce correla-
tions between the quantum states describing subsequent
signals. However, it is known that this kind of attack
does not give any advantage to Eve in the asymptotic key
limit, if the local dimension of the involved Hilbert spaces
are finite [11]. Unfortunately, the quantum de Finetti
theorem cannot be directly applied here, as one needs
to bound the local dimension of Bob’s received states,
which generally is infinite dimensional in CV-QKD. Re-
cent work [12] indicates that there is hope that one can
extend this results to the infinite dimensional case.
The experimental feasibility of various CV-QKD
schemes using coherent states as input and variations
of homodyne detection has already been demonstrated
[7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Although promising from a tech-
nological point of view as the measurement can operate
at high repetition rates, the efficiency of these schemes
seems to be limited by the classical post-processing pro-
tocol. In general, the performance can be improved by
using reverse reconciliation (RR): one reverses the flow
of classical information in the error-correction step of the
2protocol, so that the raw key is based upon Bob’s mea-
surement results [7]. If a practical error-correction pro-
cedure with non-ideal efficiency is considered, additional
procedures like postselection [18] might become favorable
to increase the efficiency [3]. Here, we limit ourselves to
the idealized scenario of CV-QKD involving noiseless de-
tectors and perfect error-correction. Consequently, we
suppose that a RR protocol without postselection pro-
cedures is used. The aim is to present the still missing
security analysis for a discrete modulated CV-QKD valid
in an idealized setting but considering arbitrary noise in
the collective attack scenario. It should also be noted
that in a typical physical realization, Alice sends an ad-
ditional phase reference pulse to Bob via Eve’s domain.
In general, Eve could interact with this additional mode
as well to gain more information about the exchanged sig-
nals. As shown by Ha¨seler et al. [19], a full security proof
would have to take the full two mode structure of the
signals into account, but also additional measurements
have to be done to test the reference-signal structure of
the two modes. Here, we present a simplified proof and
assume that Bob’s phase reference is prepared locally.
Consequently, our signals are single modes.
Typical experiments show that the dominant contribu-
tion to the excess noise in CV-QKD is due to the elec-
tronic noise of the detectors [15]. Therefore, we expect
the channel excess noise relevant in CV-QKD to be rel-
atively low and of the order of a few percent. Our anal-
ysis is based on work done by Rigas [20], who gave an
estimation of the maximal eigenvalues and correspond-
ing eigenstates of a quantum state based on homodyne
detection. In our protocol, Alice uses coherent states as
signals. If the quantum channel imposes loss onto the sig-
nals, but is noiseless otherwise, Bob’s received states ρxB,
conditioned on Alice sending the bit-value x, are pure co-
herent states. In contrast to that, Bob will receive mixed
conditional states if the quantum channel imposes ad-
ditional noise upon the signals. Consequently, the maxi-
mal eigenvalue of the received states ρxB will deviate from
unity as 1 − ε˜x. In this article, we use ε˜x together with
the overlap of the corresponding eigenstates ε˜x as a fig-
ure of merit to quantify the amount excess noise present
in the quantum channel. These parameters will be con-
nected to the observed measurement outcomes of Alice
and Bob in Sec. V. For ε˜x = 0, we retrieve the known
results for the lossy channel given in Ref. [3]. Therefore,
we expect our approach to yield positive key rates as long
as the noise of the quantum channel and consequently ε˜x
is small enough.
This article is organized as follows: In the next section,
we introduce a binary CV-QKD protocol where Bob is
allowed to coarse grain his continuous measurement out-
comes to discrete bit-values arbitrarily, which will be used
as the raw key. Therefore, we modify the known secu-
rity analysis for collective attacks to include this addi-
tional step in Sec. III. Then, we proceed by computing
the secret key rate of a binary CV-QKD protocol with a
fixed discretization of the continuous measurement out-
comes. This will be done in two steps: in Sec. IV, we
give an expression for the secret key rate in terms of max-
imal eigenvalues and corresponding eigenstates of Bob’s
received conditional states. These parameters are then
estimated via Bob’s homodyne measurement in the pro-
ceeding section. We conclude with a numerical evaluation
of the secret key rate in a experimental relevant scenario
and a discussion of the results.
II. THE PROTOCOL
We consider a prepare-and-measure protocol using
continuous variable states and homodyne detection. In
general, we allow Bob to discretize his continuous mea-
surement outcomes and to do announcements arbitrarily.
However, we also give a description of a concrete protocol
as an example with those steps specified. This specific
protocol will be used in Sec. VI to evaluate the secret
key rate for a typical experiment numerically. Any QKD
protocol can be decomposed into two phases. In the first
phase Alice prepares quantum states and sends them to
Bob, who then performs measurements on them. In the
second phase, Alice and Bob use an authenticated two-
way channel for classical communication to turn the clas-
sical data (knowledge of signals sent, and measurement
results) into a secret key.
Quantum phase:
1. Alice sends a sequence of coherent states with
amplitude α but randomly selected opposing
phase, |α〉 or | − α〉, to Bob. Alice stores her
choice for signal i in a variable xi by assigning
to the choice |α〉 the value xi = 1, and to |−α〉
to xi = 0.
2. Bob randomly measures each signal with a ho-
modyne measurement corresponding to the q
or p quadratures [18]. We denote Bob’s mea-
surement results as yi and denote the basis
choice by the binary variable bi (We choose
the reference frame such that the signal states
are modulated in the q quadratures.
Classical phase:
3. After the quantum phase, Bob announces for
each signal the measurement basis.
4. Alice and Bob test their correlations by pub-
lishing randomly selected data points xi and
yi. Moreover all of their data (Alice’s modula-
tion and Bob’s full measurement result) that
originated from Bob measuring the p quadra-
ture is published and used to check for Eve’s
interference.
35. Alice and Bob dismiss the data that originated
from measuring in the p basis for the remain-
ing key distillation part of the protocol in or-
der to obtain the sifted key.
6. Let us denote the string of outcomes pertain-
ing to the sifted key as {~x, ~y}. From the col-
lection of outcomes ~y Bob computes a string ~u
and ~˜y to that we will refer to as the announce-
ment and the discretization in the following.
7. Bob announces ~u and keeps ~˜y. In general,
the announced vector ~u will have continuous
entries. Bob could, for example, announce
the modulus |yi| of his measurement result,
whenever he chose the q-quadrature as basis.
The discretization ~˜y is vector with discrete en-
tries from which the secret key will be gener-
ated. This could be, for example, the sign of
Bob’s outcomes yi whenever he measured the
q-quadrature.
8. Bob sends Alice error correction information
to allow her to reconcile her string ~x of the
sifted data to the corresponding string ~˜y.
9. Alice and Bob do privacy amplification by ap-
plying universal-2 hash functions to the string
~˜y, now shared by Alice and Bob. This will
effectively shorten the string ~˜y by nτ bits of
information, where n is number of transmitted
signals.
This protocol is equivalent to an entanglement based
protocol [21]. In step 1, Alice prepares a entangled state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|−α〉+ |1〉|α〉) and sends the coherent state
system to Bob. Then she measures her state in the |0〉
and |1〉 basis. Steps 2 to 9 remain the same.
III. THE SECRET KEY RATE IN THE
INFINITE KEY LIMIT
Our security analysis follows the one given in Ref.
[9, 10]. Here, we limit ourselves to the asymptotic key
limit as the number of entries n in the raw key ~y tend
to infinity. Therefore, we only consider leading terms in
n in the formulas. Let X, Y, Y˜ and U denote random
variables that can take the values ~x, ~y, ~˜y, ~u as introduced
in the preceding section. In step 6 of our protocol, Bob
announces ~u, so that this information becomes available
to both Alice and Eve. The classical information con-
tained in the announcement can be formally embedded
in a quantum system ρU. After the announcement, the
system ρXU describes Alice’s data and ρEU describes the
state Eve holds. Later in the step 8 of the protocol Bob
sends error correction information over the public chan-
nel to Alice. As Eve can listen to this channel, the infor-
mationW about the key contained in the error correction
becomes available to her. Again, we can formally embed
this classical information in a quantum state ρW. After
the error correction, Alice and Bob share ~˜y and Eve’s
knowledge about the exchanged data is summarized in a
state ρEUW. According to Ref. [22] one has to shrink
the raw key by nτ = S(Y˜ : EUW) bits of information
in the asymptotic key limit, where S denotes the quan-
tum mutual information [23], so that the final key will
be secure with high probability. The secret key rate that
Alice and Bob finally can obtain is given by H(Y˜)− nτ ,
where H(Y˜) describes the Shannon entropy of Y˜, which
can be evaluated after the channel test. From Ref. [9]
we know that
nτ = S(Y˜ : EUW) ≤ S(Y˜ : EU) + I(Y˜ : W), (1)
where I denotes the Shannon mutual information [24].
Alice has to correct all the errors in her string ~x in step
8 of the protocol. Therefore, Bob sends Alice error cor-
rection information. The amount of error correction in-
formation necessary for Alice to succeed is given by
I(Y˜ : W) = f(e)[H(Y˜)− I(XU : Y˜)], (2)
where f(e) ≥ 1 denotes the efficiency of the error correc-
tion procedure. Alice and Bob know the amount of pub-
lished error correction information after step 8. In the
following, we assume that the error correction is ideal,
so that f(e) = 1. From the Eqs. (1,2) we know that we
have to shrink the key in the privacy amplification step
by
nτ ≤ S(Y˜ : EU) +H(Y˜)− I(XU : Y˜),
bits of information. The length of the final secret key
that Alice and Bob can obtain is given by
nG = H(Y˜)− nτ (3)
≥ I(XU : Y˜)− S(EU : Y˜)
= I(X : Y˜|U)− S(E : Y˜|U) .
In the third line we have used the result that S(UV :
W ) = S(U : W |V ) + S(V : W ), which also holds for the
classical mutual information I(UV : W ) in particular.
The length of the secret key can be lower bounded as
nG = I(X : Y˜|U)− S(E : Y˜|U)
= I(X : Y˜|U)− S(E|U) + S(E|UY˜)
≥ I(X : Y˜|U)− S(Y : E) , (4)
where we have used the definition of the quantum mu-
tual information S(E : Y˜|U) in the second line. The
third line follows from the concavity of the entropy [23]
as we will explain now. After Alice’s and Bob’s mea-
surements, Eve’s knowledge about the exchanged data
is summarized in conditional quantum states ρ~x,~yE . Eve’s
states conditioned on Bob’s measurement outcomes y are
therefore given by
ρ~yE =
∑
~x
P (~x|~y)ρ~x,~yE . (5)
4From the measured outcomes ~y, Bob computes the an-
nouncement ~u and the discretization ~˜y. This can be
modelled by a classical channel described by some given
conditional probability distribution P (~y|~u) , ~˜y. The state
ρ~u,
~˜y
E can therefore be written as
ρ~u,
~˜y
E =
∑
~y
P
(
~y|~u, ~˜y
)
ρ~yE . (6)
It follows that the conditional entropy S(E|UY˜) can be
bounded from below as
S(E|UY˜) =
∑
~˜y
∫
d~uP (~u, ~˜y)S
(
ρ~u,
~˜y
E
)
(7)
=
∑
~˜y
∫
d~uP (~u, ~˜y)S
(∫
d~yP
(
~y|~u, ~˜y
)
ρ~yE
)
≥
∑
~˜y
∫
d~uP (~u, ~˜y)
∫
d~yP
(
~y|~u, ~˜y
)
S(ρ~yE)
=
∑
~y
P (~y)S(ρ~yE) = S(E|Y) ,
where we first used Eq. (6) and then the concavity of
the entropy. Since the conditional entropy S(E|U) obeys
S(E|U) ≤ S(E) by the concavity of the entropy [23], the
last line of Eq.(4) follows with the help of Eq. (7).
The lower bound in Eq. (4) has two terms, one depend-
ing on the discretization Y˜, one independent of it. We
expect to be able to find a discretization for arbitrary cor-
relations between Alice and Bob, so that the first term
goes to I(X : Y), e.g. a family of discretizations Y˜∆
that tend to the identity Y˜∆ → Y asymptotically as
∆ → 0. Here, the parameter ∆ describes the size of the
coarse-graining of continuous measurement outcomes to
a certain discrete value. In Sec. VI we will give a simple
example of a discretization that can achieve the bound
I(X : Y) for particular class of correlations between Al-
ice and Bob without an asymptotic procedure.
In the following, we limit our security analysis to the
collective attack scenario and assume that the total state
shared by Alice, Bob and Eve has tensor product form
ρ⊗nABE . Thus, the measurement outcomes xi and yi are
independently identical distributed, and we can limit our-
selves to single letter distributions. Then, Bob computes
y˜ and announces values u from his measured value of y.
Therefore, Eq. (4) can be simplified as
G ≥ I(X : Y˜ |U)− S(Y : E) , (8)
where we have introduced the single letter random vari-
ables X , Y , Y˜ and U that can take the values x, y, y˜ and
u respectively. The remaining central problem is to find
a upper bound to S(E : Y ) as the first term is already
available from the observed outcomes. Without loss of
the generality, we can assume Eve holds the purification
of ρABE. Define the set ΞABE(ρ) as a collection of all
of the possible pure state ρABE that compatible with the
observations available from the measurement. The secret
key rate is then given by
G ≥ I(X : Y˜ |U)− max
ρABE∈ΞABE(ρ)
S(Y : E). (9)
In this article, we calculate this expression (9) for
the binary modulated CV-QKD scheme introduced in
Sec. II. This will be done as follows: first, we will di-
vide the entropy S(Y : E) into three terms. Then we
will give an upper bound to each term independently.
These bounds can either be directly given by Bob’s ob-
served first and second moments or can be expressed as
functions of the maximal eigenvalues and corresponding
eigenstates of Eve’s conditional states. We conclude our
proof by estimating these parameters via the first and
second moments of Bob’s homodyne measurements us-
ing the results of Ref. [20] combined with an argument
based on Schmidt’s decomposition. In the last section
we evaluate the expected secret key rate G for typical
observations numerically.
IV. LOWER BOUND ON THE SECRET KEY
RATE
The central problem of calculating the secret key rate
in a reverse reconciliation scheme according to Eq. 9 is to
find an upper bound for the mutual information S(Y : E)
that can be estimated by observable quantities. This
will be done in the following. As the mutual information
between Alice and Eve is given by
S(X : E) = S(E)− S(E|X) ,
one can express the quantum mutual information S(Y :
E) between Bob and Eve in Eq.(9) as
S(Y : E) = S(E|X) + S(X : E)− S(E|Y ) . (10)
As already mentioned, we will proceed to calculate an
upper bound for S(Y : E) by bounding the three terms
S(E|X), S(X : E) and S(E|Y ) on the right hand side
of Eq. (10) individually. As we will see later, we can di-
rectly compute an upper bound for S(E|X) from Bob’s
observed data. The remaining two terms will be given as
functions of the maximal eigenvalues 1 − ε˜x and corre-
sponding eigenstates |ε˜x〉 of Eve’s conditional states ρxE .
In Ref. [20], Rigas presented an estimation of the max-
imal eigenvalue and corresponding eigenstate of an un-
known quantum state based on the first and second mo-
ments of a homodyne measurement. We use this result to
estimate the biggest eigenvalue 1− ε˜x and corresponding
eigenstate |ε˜x〉 of Eve’s conditional states ρxE via Bob’s
measurements. We can express Eve’s conditional states
using this notation as
ρxE = (1− ε˜x)|ε˜x〉〈ε˜x|+ ε˜xσxE , (11)
5where |ε˜x〉〈ε˜x| have σxE orthogonal support. We will refer
to the eigenstate belonging to the maximal eigenvalue as
the maximal eigenstate.
In the following, we will assume that the maximal
eigenvalues 1 − ε˜x and eigenvectors |ε˜x〉 are given. Sec-
tion V contains an estimation of these parameters from
measurement data and will conclude our approach.
It turns out that an upper bound for Eve’s conditional
entropy S(E|X), the first term on the right hand side
of Eq. (10), can be obtained by exploiting Gaussian ex-
tremality properties [25]. The second term is the mutual
information between Alice and Eve S(X : E), which can
be upper bounded by employing a suitable purification
method. The estimation of the third term, the entropy
S(E|Y ) conditioned on Bob’s measurement outcomes Y
is technically more involved and includes a linearization
of the respective quantities, so that a bound can be eval-
uated.
A. Eve’s entropy S(E|X) conditioned on Alice’s
variable X
For given first and second moments of Bob’s measure-
ment outcomes, we have to find an upper bound for Eve’s
conditional entropy S(E|X), which is the first term on
the right hand side of Eq. (10). The a priori probabilities
P (x) are fixed by Alice’s state preparation. In the entan-
glement based description of the protocol, Alice’s state
preparation is equivalent to projection measurement onto
her A system of a pure three party state ρABE . It follows
that the combined two party state ρxEB = |ΨxBE〉〈ΨxBE |
between Eve and Bob conditioned on Alice’s measure-
ment outcome x is pure. Therefore, by Schmidt’s de-
composition, we conclude that S(ρxE) = S(ρ
x
B) [23]. It
is known that the state with maximal entropy S(ρxB) for
fixed first and second moments is Gaussian [25, 26]. Since
S(ρxE) = S(ρ
x
B) and P (x) is fixed, one can directly apply
the result given in Eqs. (15) and (16) of Ref. [26], so
that
S(E|X) =
∑
x
P (x)S(ρxE) (12)
≤ 1
2
∑
x
[(1 + Vx) log2(1 + Vx)− Vx log2 Vx] .
The term
Vx =
√
V 2Yq|xV
2
Yp|x
− 1/2 (13)
quantifies the amount of excess noise imposed by the
quantum channel connecting Alice and Bob. It is a func-
tion of Bob’s observed variances V 2Yq|X and V
2
Yp|X of the
corresponding quadrature distributions, that are given
by
V 2Yq |X = tr
(
ρxB qˆ
2
)− [tr (ρxB qˆ)]2 (14)
V 2Yp|X = tr
(
ρxB pˆ
2
)− [tr (ρxB pˆ)]2 ,
(15)
and the quadrature operators qˆ and pˆ are defined as
qˆ =
1√
2
(
aˆ+ aˆ†
)
(16)
pˆ =
i√
2
(
aˆ− aˆ†) ,
whereas aˆ and aˆ† denote the photon annihilation and
creation operators.
B. The mutual information S(X : E) between Alice
and Eve
Here, we employ methods known from state estima-
tion to calculate the mutual information term S(X : E)
between Alice and Eve in Eq. (10). After interacting
with the signal states, Eve holds the conditional states
ρxE in her ancilla system, that she wants to distinguish
optimally in order to maximize the mutual information
S(X : E). If we introduce an auxiliary system Q that
contains a purification of the states ρ0E and ρ
1
E , we can
give an upper bound for S(X : E): the mutual informa-
tion can never increase when discarding subsystems, so
that
S(X : E) ≤ S(X : QE) (17)
holds. We choose the purification Q, so that the con-
ditional states ρxE are purified as |ΨxEQ〉. There are cer-
tainly purifications that would leak too much information
to Eve, i.e. if one would supply Eve with a purification
of the global state ρXQE . Since Eq.(17) is valid for any
purification, we would ideally choose one that minimizes
S(X : QE) to make the bound (17) as tight as possible.
This problem is closely connected to Uhlmann’s theorem,
as we will show now.
It has been shown that the quantum mutual informa-
tion between a classical register described by the binary
variable X and a quantum system QE can be expressed
as
S(X : QE) = h
[
1
2
(
1− |〈Ψ0EQ
∣∣Ψ1EQ〉∣∣)
]
, (18)
if the conditional states |ΨxEQ〉 are pure [3]. Here, h de-
notes the binary entropy function
h(z) = −z log2 z − (1− z) log2(1− z) . (19)
Since S(X : EQ) monotonously increases with decreas-
ing overlap |〈Ψ0EQ|Ψ1EQ〉|, it is sufficient to find the pu-
rification Q that maximizes the overlap |〈Ψ0EQ
∣∣Ψ1EQ〉∣∣ to
minimize S(X : EQ). The solution to this problem is
known as Uhlmann’s theorem [23]:
F
(
ρ0E , ρ
1
E
)
= max
|Ψ0
EQ
〉,|Ψ1
EQ
〉
|〈Ψ0EQ|Ψ1EQ〉| (20)
6Here, the Uhlmann fidelity F
(
ρ0E , ρ
1
E
)
is defined as
F
(
ρ0E , ρ
1
E
)
= trE
(√√
ρ0Eρ
1
E
√
ρ0E
)
. (21)
Therefore, we conclude that the tightest bound obtain-
able from Eq. (17) to mutual information S(X : QE) for
a binary modulated setup is given by Eq. (20) and Eq.
(18) as
S(X : E) ≤ h
[
1
2
{
1− F (ρ0E , ρ1E)}
]
(22)
In general, the upper bound (22) of the mutual infor-
mation S(X : E) can be calculated, if the Eve’s condi-
tional states ρxE are known. However, the full information
about the states ρxE is usually not available from mea-
surements. As already mentioned, we base our security
analysis on the estimation of the maximal eigenvalues
1− ε˜x and corresponding eigenstates |ε˜x〉 of Eve’s condi-
tional states ρxE that we will estimate by Alice and Bob’s
observation. Therefore, we proceed by giving an upper
bound of S(X : E) as function of these parameters. This
can be done by by considering a particular purification
Q.
Any purification |ΨxEQ〉 can be expanded as
|ΨxEQ〉 =
∑
i
cxi |ixQ〉|ixE〉 . (23)
Without loss of generality, we can choose the first term
in the Schmidt-decomposition (23) to correspond to the
maximal eigenvalue cx0
2 := 1 − ε˜x. The corresponding
eigenstate is then given by Eq. (11) as |0xE〉 = |ε˜x〉. With
the help of expansion (23), the modulus of the overlap
between the two conditional states can be evaluated as
∣∣〈Ψ0EQ|Ψ1EQ〉∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ij
c0i c
1
j〈i0i |j1Q〉〈i0E |j1E〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (24)
If one chooses 〈i0Q|j1Q〉 = δijeiϕi , where δij is the Kro-
necker delta function and the phase ϕi is the negative of
the phase of the complex number 〈i0E |i1E〉, it follows that
∣∣〈Ψ0EQ|Ψ1EQ〉∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
c0i c
1
i e
iϕi〈i0E |i1E〉
∣∣∣∣∣ (25)
≥
√
(1 − ε˜0)(1− ε˜1) |〈ε˜0|ε˜1〉| .
Therefore, we obtain a lower bound on the quantum
mutual information S(X : E) using Eq. (18) and Eq.
(25) as
S(X : E) ≤ S(X : QE) (26)
≤ h
[
1
2
(1−
√
(1− ε˜0)(1 − ε˜1)γ)
]
,
where we introduced
γ := |〈ε˜0|ε˜1〉| , (27)
as a short hand notation for the overlap of Eve’s maximal
eigenstates. In Sec. V we will estimate the values for ε˜x
and γ via Bob’s homodyne measurements.
C. Eve’s entropy S(E|Y ) conditioned on Bob’s
measurement outcome Y
The last term of Eq. (10) to be estimated reads
S(E|Y ) =
∫
dyP (y)S(ρyE) . (28)
Prior to Alice’s measurement, the three party state ρABE
can be assumed to be pure. Since Alice performs a pro-
jection measurement on her subsystem, it follows that the
combined two party state ρxEB = |ΨxBE〉〈ΨxBE | between
Eve and Bob conditioned on Alice’s measurement result
is pure. Moreover, Bob performs a projection measure-
ment |y〉〈y| on his subsystem, so that Eve’s state |ΨxyE 〉
conditioned on Alice’s measurement outcome x and Bob’s
outcome y is pure. Eve’s states ρyE conditioned on Bob’s
measurement outcome y can be written as
ρyE = P (0|y)|Ψ0yE 〉〈Ψ0yE |+ P (1|y)|Ψ1yE 〉〈Ψ1yE | . (29)
From Sec. III.C of Ref. [3] we know that
S(ρyE) = h
[
1
2
− 1
2
√
1− 4P (0|y)P (1|y)(1− |〈Ψ0yE |Ψ1yE 〉|2)
]
= g
(
P (0|y),
∣∣∣〈Ψ0yE |Ψ1yE 〉∣∣∣) , (30)
where we have introduced the function
g
(
P (0|y),
∣∣∣〈Ψ0yE |Ψ1yE 〉∣∣∣) as a shorthand notation.
As we can see, the entropy S(E|Y ) to be evaluated is a
function of the overlaps
Γy =
∣∣∣〈Ψ0yE |Ψ1yE 〉∣∣∣ , (31)
that depend on the outcomes y. Additionally, the proba-
bility distributions P (0|y) and P (y) need to be estimated
by the channel test. We will proceed to lower bound the
entropy S(E|Y ) (28) by exploiting special properties of
the g function given by equation (30). It can be easily
verified that g (P (0|y),Γy) as a function of the overlaps
has the following properties:
g(P (0|y), 1) = 0 (32)
∂g(P (0|y), x)
∂x
≤ 0 (33)
∂2g(P (0|y), x)
∂x2
≤ 0 (34)
We introduce positive and real parameters γy and ∆γy
such that we can rewrite the overlap Γy (31) as
Γy ≤ γy +∆γy . (35)
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1γy γ +∆γy
Γy
g (P (0|y), γy +∆γy))
g (P (0|y), γy))
g (P (0|y), γy)−
g(P (0|y),γy)
1−γy
∆γy
0
FIG. 1: Schematical representation of the function
g (P (0|1),Γy).The validity of Eq. (36) can easily be checked
for all Γy ≤ γy +∆γy.
It follows that for any 0 ≤ Γy ≤ 1 the inequality
g(P (0|y),Γy) ≥ g(P (0|y), γy +∆γy) (36)
≥ g(P (0|y), γy)− g(P (0|y), γy)
1− γy ∆γy
holds, as the first line of Eq. (36) follows from the mono-
tonicity (33) and the second line follows from the con-
cavity (34) together with property (32) if 0 ≤ γy ≤ 1.
Later we will give explicit expressions for the decomposi-
tion (35), so that these properties can easily be checked.
Fig. (1) illustrates Eq. (36) schematically.
Moreover, the approximation of Eq. (36) can simplified
further, if one could find a parameter γ˜ independent of y
with the properties γ˜ ≥ γy and γ˜ ≤ 1, as
g(P (0|y), γy) ≥ g (P (0|y), γ˜) (37)
g (P (0|y), γy)
1− γy ≤
g (P (0|y), γ˜)
1− γ˜ .
We will see later that setting γ˜ to γ as defined in Eq.
(27) satisfies these constraints. The first bound of (37) is
a simple consequence of the monotonicity (33), whereas
the second inequality follows from the properties (32–34).
It can easily be verified by realizing that the quantity
g(P (0|y),Γy)
1−Γy is given by the modulus of the gradient of
the straight line connecting the points g (P (0|y),Γy) and
g (P (0|y),Γy = 1) = 0. From Fig. 1 it is obvious that
this modulus increases if one chooses the point Γy to be
closer to one. Therefore, the second bound of (37) is valid
for all γ˜ satisfying γy ≤ γ˜ ≤ 1. Finally, we can estimate
the conditional entropy S(E|Y ) given by Eq. (28) with
the help of the expressions (36) and (37) as
S(E|Y ) =
∫
dyP (y)S(ρyE) (38)
≥
∫
dyP (y)g(P (0|y), γ˜)
− 1
1− γ˜
∫
dyP (y)g(P (0|y), γ˜)∆γy .
=
∫
dyP (y)g(P (0|y), γ˜)−∆S ,
where we introduced the term ∆S as a shorthand nota-
tion.
In the following, we will give explicit expressions for
the missing parameters γy, ∆γy and γ˜ in order to con-
nect these parameters to quantities that are observable
to Alice and Bob. The starting point of this analysis is
again noticing that the state |ΨxBE〉 that Bob and Eve
share conditioned on Alice’s measurement outcome x is
pure, so that one can decompose it as
|ΨxBE〉 =
√
(1− ε˜x)|β˜x〉|ε˜x〉+
√
ε˜x|ϕxEB〉 , (39)
using Schmidt’s decomposition theorem [23]. We have in-
troduced eigenstate |β˜x〉 of Bob’s conditional density ma-
trix ρxB corresponding to the maximal eigenvalue 1− ε˜x.
All terms orthogonal to |β˜x〉|ε˜x〉 are summed up in the
term |ϕxEB〉, such that 〈β˜x|ϕxEB〉 = 0 and 〈ε˜x|ϕxEB〉 = 0.
From Eq. (39), one can construct Eve’s states |ΨxyE 〉
conditioned on both Alice’s and Bob’s measurement out-
comes as
|ΨxyE 〉 =
√
(1− ε˜x)〈y|β˜x〉|ε˜x〉+
√
ε˜x〈yB|ϕxEB〉√
P (y|x) . (40)
by projecting Bob’s system onto |y〉B〈y|. The conditional
probabilities P (y|x) are given by
P (y|x) = (1 − ε˜x)|〈y|β˜x〉|2 + ε˜x |〈ϕxEB |y〉B〈y|ϕxEB〉|2 .
(41)
By setting
axy =
〈y|β˜x〉√
P (y|x) (42)
and
bxy =
√〈ϕxEB |y〉B〈y|ϕxEB〉√
P (y|x) , (43)
we can express Eq.(40) as
|ΨxyE 〉 =
√
(1− ε˜x)axy |ε˜x〉+
√
ε˜xb
x
y |ϕxyE 〉, (44)
where |ε˜x〉 is orthogonal to |ϕxyE 〉. The normalized states
|ϕxyE 〉 are given by Eqs. (40), (42), (43) and (44) as
|ϕxyE 〉 = (〈ϕxEB |y〉B〈y|ϕxEB〉)−
1
2 〈yB|ϕxEB〉 . (45)
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real. Moreover, from expansion (44) it is obvious that
√
1− ε˜xaxy ≤ 1 (46)
holds. The overlap Γy is given by Eq. (44) as
Γy =
∣∣∣〈Ψ0yE |Ψ1yE 〉∣∣∣ (47)
=
∣∣∣√(1− ε˜0)(1 − ε˜1)a0ya1y〈ε˜0|ε˜1〉
+
√
(1− ε˜0)ε˜1a0yb1y〈ε˜0|ϕ1yE 〉
+
√
(1− ε˜1)ε˜0b0ya1y〈ϕ0yE |ε˜1〉
+
√
ε˜0ε˜1b
0
yb
1
y〈ϕ0yE |ϕ1yE 〉
∣∣∣ ,
so that Eq. (35) follows from (47) by triangle inequality
with the parameters γy and ∆γy defined as
γy =
∣∣∣√(1 − ε˜0)(1− ε˜1)a0ya1y〈ε˜0|ε˜1〉∣∣∣ (48)
=
∣∣∣√(1 − ε˜0)(1− ε˜1)a0ya1y∣∣∣ γ
∆γy =
∣∣∣√(1 − ε˜0)ε˜1a0yb1y〈ε˜0|ϕ1yE 〉
+
√
(1 − ε˜1)ε˜0b0ya1y〈ϕ0yE |ε˜1〉
+
√
ε˜0ε˜1b
0
yb
1
y〈ϕ0yE |ϕ1yE 〉
∣∣∣ .
With the help of Eq. (46), the parameter γy can be upper
bounded as
γy =
∣∣∣√(1− ε˜0)(1 − ε˜1)a0ya1y∣∣∣ γ ≤ γ , (49)
so that we can set
γ˜ = γ (50)
to satisfy γy ≤ γ˜. Moreover, it can easily be checked that
0 ≤ γy ≤ γ ≤ 1 using property (46).
In principle, we have now everything at hand to lower
bound the conditional entropy S(E|Y ) according to Eq.
(38). However, as we will see later, we can only estimate
the overlap γ = |〈ε˜0|ε˜1〉| and eigenvalues 1 − ε˜x from
Bob’s measurements. As a consequence, the parameter
∆γy cannot be estimated by the observation and con-
sequently the term ∆S in Eq. (38) cannot computed
directly. Since ∆S is monotone in the parameter ∆γy,
it is again possible to lower bound the entropy S(E|Y )
by looking for a suitable upper bound for ∆γy which is
a function of Bob’s observable parameters. Here, we es-
timate the parameter ∆γy starting from the definitions
(48) as
∆γy ≤
∣∣∣√(1 − ε˜0)ε˜1a0yb1y∣∣∣ ∣∣∣〈ε˜0|ϕ1yE 〉∣∣∣ (51)
+
∣∣∣√(1− ε˜1)ε˜0a1yb0y∣∣∣ ∣∣∣〈ε˜1|ϕ0yE 〉∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣√ε˜0ε˜1b0yb1y∣∣∣ ∣∣∣〈ϕ0yE |ϕ1yE 〉∣∣∣
≤
√
(1− ε˜0) ε˜1a0yb1y
√
1− |〈ε˜0|ε˜1〉|2
+
√
(1− ε˜1) ε˜0a1yb0y
√
1− |〈ε˜0|ε˜1〉|2
+
√
ε˜0ε˜1b
0
yb
1
y
≤
√
1− γ2
(√
ε˜1b
1
y +
√
ε˜0b
0
y
)
+
√
ε˜0ε˜1b
0
yb
1
y
where we first used the triangle inequality. For the second
inequality in Eq. (51) we used
∣∣∣〈ϕ0yE |ϕ1yE 〉∣∣∣ ≤ 1 and
|〈Φ|ε˜x〉|2 + |〈Φ|ϕxyE 〉|2 ≤ 1 , (52)
which is valid for any vector |Φ〉 by orthogonality of the
states |ε˜x〉 and |ϕxyE 〉. In particular, we used
|〈ε˜0|ε˜1〉|2 +
∣∣∣〈ε˜0|ϕ1yE 〉∣∣∣2 ≤ 1 (53)
|〈ε˜1|ε˜0〉|2 +
∣∣∣〈ε˜1|ϕ0yE 〉∣∣∣2 ≤ 1 ,
which follows from Eq. (52) by setting |Φ〉 = |ε0〉 and
x = 1 for the first inequality or respectively |Φ〉 = |ε1〉
and x = 0 for the last inequality in Eq. (53). In the last
step of Eq. (51), we used the definition (27) of γ and the
bound (46).
With the expression (51), we can upper bound the term
∆S of Eq.(38) as
∆S ≤
√
1 + γ
1− γ
∫
dyP (y)g(P (0|y), γ)
(√
ε˜0b
0
y +
√
ε˜1b
1
y
)
(54)
+
1
1− γ
∫
dyP (y)g(P (0|y), γ)
(√
ε˜0ε˜1b
0
yb
1
y
)
.
These integrals can be estimated first applying the com-
pleteness relation
∫
dy|y〉〈y| = I of Bob’s homodyne mea-
surement to the definition (43). It follows that∫
dyP (y|x)bxy2 =
∫
dy〈ϕxEB|y〉B〈y|ϕxEB〉 = 1 . (55)
This condition on the parameters bxy enables us to upper
bound the remaining terms in Eq. (54) as∫
dyP (y)g(P (0|y), γ)
√
ε˜xb
x
y (56)
≤
√
ε˜x
2
∫
dyP (y)
g2(P (0|y), γ)
P (x|y) ,
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dyP (y)g(P (0|y), γ)
√
ε˜0ε˜1b
0
yb
1
y ≤
√
ε˜0ε˜1g
(
1
2
, γ
)
.
(57)
with the help of the Cauchy-Schwarz-Buniakovsky in-
equality [27]. Details of this estimation can be found
in Appendix A.
Let us summarize our results. We can use Eq. (50) in
Eq. (38) to bound the conditional entropy S(E|Y ) as
S(E|Y ) ≥
∫
dyP (y)g (P (0|y), γ)−∆S . (58)
It follows from the inequalities (54), (56) and (57) that
the term ∆S can be upper bounded as
∆S ≤ ε˜0k0 + ε˜1k1 +
√
ε˜0ε˜1k˜ , (59)
where we defined parameters kx and k˜ as
kx =
√
1 + γ
2(1− γ)
∫
dyP (y)
g2 (P (0|y), γ)
P (x|y) (60)
k˜ =
1
1− γ g
(
1
2
, γ
)
.
Finally, a lower bound for the conditional entropy
S(E|Y ) is therefore given by Eqs. (58) and (54) as
S(E|Y ) ≥
∫
dyP (y)g (P (0|y), γ) (61)
−
√
ε˜0k0 −
√
ε˜1k1 −
√
ε˜0ε˜1k˜ .
D. The mutual information S(Y : E) between Bob
and Eve
We have shown that an upper bound for the mutual
information S(Y : E) between Bob and Eve is given by
Eq. (10), (12), (26) and (61) as
S(Y : E) =S(E|X) + S(X : E)− S(E|Y ) (62)
≤1
2
∑
x
[(1 + Vx) log2(1 + Vx)− Vx log2 Vx]
+ h
[
1
2
(1−
√
(1− ε˜0)(1 − ε˜1)γ)
]
−
∫
dyP (y)g[P (0|y), γ]
+
√
ε˜0k0 +
√
ε˜1k1 +
√
ε˜0ε˜1k˜
=
1
2
∑
x
[(1 + Vx) log2(1 + Vx)− Vx log2 Vx]
+ s(ε˜x, γ) . (63)
The first term in Eq. (62) can be directly computed from
Bob’s observed variances (14) using Eq. (13). Here, we
define the function s(ε˜x, γ) to summarize all terms that
depend on the maximal eigenvalues 1−ε˜x and overlap γ of
the corresponding eigenstates of Eve’s conditional states.
The remaining problem is to estimate these parameters
via Bob’s homodyne measurement.
V. MAXIMAL EIGENVALUE AND
EIGENSTATE
We have already shown in the last section that the two
party states |ΨxBE〉 conditioned on Alice’s measurement
outcome x can be chosen to be pure. Therefore, one
can expand these conditional states using the Schmidt-
decomposition (39), so that the state |β˜x〉|ε˜x〉 is orthog-
onal to |ϕxEB〉. From Eq.(39) it follows that the ρxE and
ρxB have the same spectrum. Moreover, the eigenvectors
of Bob’s and Eve’s system are determined up to a global
unitary operation on Eve’s system. According to Eq.
(62), we need to estimate the modulus of the overlap of
Eve’s maximal eigenstates |ε˜x〉 and the maximal eigen-
values 1 − ε˜x. These parameters can be estimated from
the first and second moments of Bob’s measured data
[20], as we will see in the following.
Suppose the fidelity between Bob’s received condi-
tional state ρxB and a pure coherent state |β〉 satisfies
〈βx|ρxB|βx〉 = 1− εx . (64)
The amplitude βx is given by the first moments of Bob’s
homodyne measurement as
Re(βx) = tr(ρ
x
B qˆ) (65)
Im(βx) = tr(ρ
x
B pˆ) .
The quadrature operators qˆ and pˆ are defined in Eq. (16).
In the following, we will refer to the parameter εx as the
mixedness of Bob’s conditional states.
It has been shown by Rigas [20] that the mixedness εx
of the conditional states can be upper bounded from the
outcomes of a homodyne measurement as
εx ≤ 1
2
[
(V 2Yq |x +
1
2
)(V 2Yp|x +
1
2
)− 1
]
= Ux, (66)
where VYq|x and V
2
Yp|x denote the variances of the q-
and p-quadrature distributions (14) conditioned on Al-
ice’s variable x. The proof for the estimation (66) is
given in Appendix (B). Moreover, one can also estimate
the overlap |〈β˜0|β˜1〉| of Bob’s maximal conditional eigen-
states as
cl(ε˜x, εx, κ) ≤ |〈β˜0|β˜1〉| ≤ cu(ε˜x, εx, κ) , (67)
if one assumes that the fidelity (64) is given. Here, the
parameter κ is given by the overlap of the coherent states
corresponding to the mean values (65) as
κ =
∣∣〈β0|β1〉∣∣ . (68)
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The detailed expression of cl(ε˜x, εx, κ) and cu(ε˜x, εx, κ)
can be seen in Appendix C.
The results (66) and (67) can be used to estimate the
maximal eigenvalues and overlap γ of the corresponding
eigenstates of Eve’s reduced density matrix. From the
Schmidt decomposition (39) it follows that the eigenval-
ues of Bob’s and Eve’s reduced conditional density ma-
trices are identical, so that
ε˜x ≤ εx (69)
can easily be seen by expanding ρxB in its eigenbasis.
Moreover, Eve’s attack should preserve the inner prod-
uct [3], so that 〈−α|α〉 = 〈Ψ0BE |Ψ1BE〉. In Appendix D
we show that this allows us to bound the overlap γ of
Eve’s eigenstates as
dl ≤ γ ≤ du , (70)
where
dl =
|〈−α|α〉| −
√
[
√
(1− ε˜1)ε˜0 +
√
(1− ε˜0)ε˜1]2 + ε˜1ε˜0√
(1− ε˜0)(1− ε˜1)cu(ε˜x, εx, κ)
(71)
and
du =
|〈−α|α〉| +
√
[
√
(1− ε˜1)ε˜0 +
√
(1− ε˜0)ε˜1]2 + ε˜1ε˜0√
(1 − ε˜0)(1− ε˜1)cl(ε˜x, εx, κ)
.
(72)
The functions cl(ε˜x, εx, κ) and cu(ε˜x, εx, κ) are the ex-
tremal values of the overlap
∣∣∣〈β˜0|β˜1〉∣∣∣ of Bob’s maximal
eigenstates as defined in Eq. (67).
If the first and second moments of Bob’s measurement
outcomes are fixed, Ux is given by Eq. (66). Therefore,
the parameters ε˜x that are compatible with the observed
data can vary between 0 ≤ ε˜x ≤ εx ≤ Ux. In that
respect, the quantities εx and ε˜x are interior parameters
that can only be bounded by the value of the observable
quantity Ux. For any given value of εx, ε˜x and κ, the
interval of compatible overlaps |〈β˜0|β˜1〉| according to Eq.
(67) can be given. This in turn determines the interval
of possible overlaps γ via Eq. (70). The value for κ is
obtainable from the first moments of Bob’s homodyne
measurement, as can be seen from Eq. (65). Finally, the
secret key rate can be obtained by
G ≥I(X : Y˜ |U)− max
0 ≤ ε˜x ≤ εx ≤ Ux
dl ≤ γ ≤ du
{s(ε˜x, γ) (73)
− 1
2
∑
x
[(1 + Vx) log2(1 + Vx)− Vx log2 Vx]} .
The maximum is taken over the interior parameters ε˜x,
εx and γ satisfying the bounds shown. These interior pa-
rameters can vary in intervals that are fixed by the values
of Ux and κ that can be determined from the observa-
tion. As the s-function (62) contains details about Bob’s
measured data via the probability distributions P (y) and
P (0|y), this additional information must be estimated
from the measured data to analyze the secret key rate
numerically for a given observation.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The secret key rate (73) depends on Bob’s observed
probability distributions P (y|x) directly via the mutual
information term I(X : Y˜ |U) between Alice and Bob and
via the term s(ε˜x, γ), as can be seen from Eq. (62). The
distribution P (y|x) is in principle available from exper-
iments. To evaluate the secret key rate in an example,
we simulate data for a typical experimental situation in
which we find a Gaussian distribution [7, 8, 15]. There-
fore, we choose the probability distribution P (y|x) to be
parameterized as
P (y|x) = 1√
2πV 2
Yq |x
exp
[
−(√ηαx − y)2
2V 2
Yq|x
]
. (74)
Here, η is the observed channel transmission, the ampli-
tude α0 = −α1 is chosen to be real. In this parameteri-
zation, the value of κ as defined in Eq. (68) is given by
by the loss of the quantum channel and the overlap of
Alice’s input states as
κ = |〈√ηα| − √ηα〉| . (75)
Furthermore, we assume that Bob observes the same vari-
ance (14) in his measured data for both the q- and the
p- quadratures, so that
V 2Yq|x = V
2
Yp|x . (76)
Here, we use the convention for the excess noise δ given
in Ref. [28]:
δ =
V 2Yq|x
V 2
Yq|x,Vac
− 1 (77)
The quantity V 2Yq|x,Vac =
1
2 is the quadrature variance of
the vacuum state. As the a priori probabilities p(x) = 12
are fixed, the probability distribution p(y) is can easily
be evaluated with the help of (74) and the secret key rate
can be evaluated according to (73). Fig. (2) shows our
numerical results for the secret key rate versus the loss
1 − η and different values for the excess noise δ in this
typical scenario.
For the simulation, we assume that Bob announces the
modulus of his measurement outcomes y as u = |y|. The
values of y˜ are determined by the map y˜ = 0 if y <
0 and y˜ = 1 otherwise. After the announcement, the
conditional mutual information between Alice and Bob
is
I(X : Y˜ |U) = H(X |U) +H(X |Y˜ U) (78)
= H(X)−H(X |Y )
= I(X : Y ) .
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FIG. 2: Secret key rate versus channel loss for a
typical scenario with optimized signal strength. The
different lines correspond to an excess noise δ of
{0, 0.0004, 0.0008, 0.0012, 0.0016, 0.0020, 0.0024}.
The announcement u = |y| contains no information
about the bit-value x for symmetric probability distri-
butions like (74) as the conditional probability p(u|x) for
a particular announcement u is independent of x. There-
fore it follows that H(X |U) = H(X). The knowledge
of Bob’s measured outcome y is obviously equivalent to
the knowledge of u = |y| and the sign of y, so that we
have H(X |Y˜ U) = H(X |Y ). Therefore, we can achieve
I(X : Y˜ |U) = I(X : Y ) with this simple map as long as
the probability distribution satisfies the symmetry con-
dition p(x|u) = 1/2.
For the numerical evaluation we optimize the secret
key rate G over the overlap 〈−α|α〉 of the input states.
In the optimization we vary α between zero and 1 with
step-width 0.05. For each α we find the maximum of
s(ε˜x, γ) over all ε˜x ≤ εx ≤ Ux and dl ≤ γ ≤ du. We find
numerically that the maximum of s(ε˜x, γ) is attained at
the point γ = dl.
Fig. (2) shows the results of our simulation. As we
can see, the secret key rate is very susceptible to noise,
whereas it coincides with the optimal bound given in Ref.
[3] for lossy but noiseless quantum channels. However,
one should keep in mind that we only calculated an upper
bound for Eve’s knowledge, which we expect not to be
tight for finite excess noise. We have bounded all three
terms in Eq. (10) separately rather than bounding those
terms simultaneously. Furthermore, one might expect to
find a different purification for the system Q to make
the bound (26) tighter. Finally, we have linearized the
conditional entropy S(E|Y ) in Section III. B in order to
be able to find a bound. However, the error introduced
here might be quite large.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have evaluated a lower bound to the secret key rate
for a binary modulated CV-QKD protocol in the collec-
tive attack scenario. The analysis can be applied to any
given channel noise, as Alice and Bob can estimate the
conditional probability distribution p(y|x) of their mea-
surement outcomes arbitrary well in the limit that the
number of exchanged signals tends to infinity. For any
given probability distribution, the secret key rate can be
computed according to Eq. (73). Although we demon-
strate that our approach yields positive secret key rates
for the case of small Gaussian excess noise, these results
are not satisfying from a practical point of view, as the
secret key rates drop quickly with increasing excess noise.
Typically, the dominant contribution to the excess noise
in CV-QKD experiments originate from noisy detectors.
Our numerical results therefore indicate that it is neces-
sary to analyze these kind of schemes in a trusted device
scenario, if one wants to drop the assumption of ideal
detectors and obtain secret rates of practical relevance.
In this scenario, Eve cannot exploit the noise added by
the detectors.
There are several options to make the protocol more
robust against channel excess noise. One could use more
input states in order to test the quantum channel be-
tween Alice and Bob more efficiently and consequently
limit Eve’s possible interaction with the signal states. If
one compares the secret key rates of Fig. (2) with those
given in Ref. [4] which correspond to a protocol using a
Gaussian modulated, continuous set of input states and a
quantum channel imposing Gaussian noise onto the sig-
nal states, one realizes that the robustness of the secret
key rate increases by orders of magnitude. An introduc-
tion of a postselection step in the protocol can help to
increase the performance as well.
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APPENDIX A:
CAUCHY-SCHWARZ-BUNIAKOWSKY
INEQUALITY
The Cauchy-Schwarz-Buniakowsky inequality states
[27] that for any two integrable functions f(x) and g(x)(∫ b
a
dyf(y)h(y)
)2
≤
(∫ b
a
dyf2(y)
)(∫ b
a
dyh2(y)
)
(A1)
holds. Application of inequality (A1) to the left hand
side of expression (56) yields∫
dyP (y)g[P (0|y), γ]
√
ε˜xb
x
y
=
√
ε˜x
∫
dy
√
P (y|x)bxy︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(y)
{P (y)g[P (0|y), γ]/
√
P (y|x)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
h(y)
≤
√
ε˜x
√∫
dyP (y)g2[P (0|y), γ] P (y)
P (y|x) . (A2)
Since one can rewrite the conditional probability P (y|x)
as P (y|x) = P (x|y)P (y)/P (x) by using Bayes’ rule and
the a priori probabilities are given by P (x) = 12 , we have
P (y)
P (y|x) =
1
2P (x|y) (A3)
and inequality (56) follows from Eq. (A2) and Eq. (A3).
Similarly, one can evaluate the left hand side of Eq.
(57) with the condition (55) as∫
dyP (y)g [P (0|y)γ]
√
ε˜0ε˜1b
0
yb
1
y (A4)
=
√
ε˜0
√
ε˜1
∫
dy
√
P (y|1)b1y︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(y)
{P (y)g[P (0|y), γ]/
√
P (y|1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
h(y)
≤
√
ε˜0ε˜1
2
√∫
dyP (y|0)b0y2
g2 [P (0|y), γ]
P (0|y)P (1|y) ,
where we used Eq. (A3) again in the last step. Further-
more one can show that∫
dyP (y|0)b0y
2 g2 [P (0|y), γ]
P (0|y)P (1|y)
≤ max
y
{
g2 [P (0|y), γ]
P (0|y)P (1|y)
}
(A5)
= 4g2
[
1
2
, γ
]
.
The first line of Eq. (A5) again follows from the bound-
ary condition (55) for any integrable and bounded func-
tion
g2y(γ)
P (0|y)P (1|y) . The second step can be shown by an
involved but straight forward calculation. Eq. (57) now
follows from Eqs. (A4) and (A5).
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION OF THE
MIXEDNESS εx VIA HOMODYNE
MEASUREMENTS
In this Appendix, we prove that the parameter εx as
defined in Eq. (64) can be estimated via Bob’s homodyne
measurements as
εx ≤ 1
2
[(
V 2yq|x +
1
2
)(
V 2yp|x +
1
2
)
− 1
]
=
1
2
(W − 1) .
(B1)
The mixedness εx is given by the fidelity between Bob’s
received state ρxB and the pure coherent state βx as
〈βx|ρxB|βx〉 = 1− εx . (B2)
The amplitude βx is given by Eq. (65) and we use the
convention (16) for quadrature operators. The condi-
tional variances V 2yq|x and V
2
yp|x are then given by
V 2yq|x = tr
(
ρxB qˆ
2
)− [tr (ρxB qˆ)]2 (B3)
V 2yp|x = tr
(
ρxB pˆ
2
)− [tr (ρxB pˆ)]2
Let us introduce a state ρ = Dˆ(−βx)ρxBDˆ(βx) with
zero mean values for the quadrature operators (16) to
simplify the analysis. Here Dˆ(βx) denotes the displace-
ment operator according to the amplitude βx. Obviously,
〈β|ρxB|β〉 = 〈0|ρ|0〉 = 1− εx (B4)
holds, whereas |0〉 denotes the vacuum state. The vari-
ances (B3) can now be evaluated with the definition (16)
as
V 2yq|x = tr
(
ρqˆ2
)
=
1
2
tr
[
ρ
(
2nˆ+ 1 + aˆ2 + aˆ†2
)]
(B5)
V 2yp|x = tr
(
ρpˆ2
)
=
1
2
tr
[
ρ
(
2nˆ+ 1− aˆ2 − aˆ†2)] ,
where we have introduced the photon number operator
nˆ = aˆ†aˆ as short hand notation. The quantity W in Eq.
(B1) now reads
W =
1
4
tr
[
ρ
(
2nˆ+ 2 + aˆ2 +
(
aˆ†
)2)]
(B6)
× tr
[
ρ
(
2nˆ+ 2− aˆ2 − (aˆ†)2)]
= [tr (ρnˆ) + 1]
2 − 1
4
tr
[
ρ
(
aˆ2 + aˆ†2
)]2
.
We proceed in rewriting the last term in (B6) with the
help of Eqs. (B5) in the Fock-basis {|n〉}n as
tr
[
ρ
(
aˆ2 + aˆ†2
)]
=
∞∑
n=0
√
n+ 2
√
n+ 1〈n+ 2|ρ|n〉 (B7)
+
∞∑
n=2
√
n
√
n− 1〈n− 2|ρ|n〉
=2
∞∑
n=0
√
n+ 2
√
n+ 1Re〈n+ 2|ρ|n〉 .
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Since 〈i|ρ|j〉 is a positive semidefinite matrix, any prin-
cipal minor is a positive semidefinite matrix. It follows
that
〈i|ρ|i〉〈j|ρ|j〉 − |〈i|ρ|j〉|2 ≥ 0 , (B8)
as this can be interpreted as the determinant of the 2
by 2 principal minor that arises by only keeping the i-th
and j-th entries. The positivity of this determinant then
follows by realizing that the determinant is just the prod-
uct of the non-negative eigenvalues of the corresponding
principal minor [29]. The result (B8), together with the
triangle inequality, can be used to estimate the modulus
of Eq. (B7) as
∣∣tr [ρ (aˆ2 + aˆ†2)]∣∣ ≤2 ∞∑
n=0
√
n+ 2
√
n+ 1
√
〈n|ρ|n〉 (B9)
×
√
〈n+ 2|ρ|n+ 2〉
≤2
√√√√ ∞∑
n=0
(n+ 1)〈n|ρ|n〉
×
√√√√ ∞∑
n=0
(n+ 2)〈n+ 2|ρ|n+ 2〉
=2
√
tr (ρnˆ) + 1
√
tr (ρnˆ)− 〈1|ρ|1〉 .
(B10)
The second estimation in Eq. (B9) follows from the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Inserting this result into Eq.
(B6) yields
W ≥ [tr (ρnˆ) + 1] [1 + 〈1|ρ|1〉] . (B11)
We need to find a lower bound on Eq. (B11) depending
only on εx. Note that tr (ρnˆ) can be written as
tr (ρnˆ) =〈1|ρ|1〉+
∞∑
n=2
〈n|ρ|n〉n (B12)
≥〈1|ρ|1〉+ 2 (εx − 〈1|ρ|1〉) .
As it can be seen from Eq. (B4), the fidelity of ρ with
the vacuum is 1− εx. It follows that all matrix elements
〈n|ρ|n〉 for n ≥ 1 sum up to εx, so that
∑∞
n=2〈n|ρ|n〉n is
minimal if all 〈n|ρ|n〉 = 0 except for 〈2|ρ|2〉, which has
then to be equal to εx−〈1|ρ|1〉 by the summing condition.
Therefore, Eq. (B11) can be estimated as
W ≥ (1 + 2εx − 〈1|ρ|1〉) (1 + 〈1|ρ|1〉) (B13)
= 1 + 2εx + 〈1|ρ|1〉(2εx − 〈1|ρ|1〉) ,
As 0 ≤ 〈1|ρ|1〉 ≤ εx, the last term of Eq. (B13) is never
negative and equal to zero iff 〈1|ρ|1〉 = 0. It follows that
W ≥ 1 + 2εx . (B14)
Inserting this result into Eq. (B1) concludes the proof.
APPENDIX C: ESTIMATION TO THE OVERLAP
OF BOB’S MAXIMAL EIGENSTATES
In the following, we derive explicit expressions for the
bounds to the overlap |〈β˜0|β˜1〉 of Bob’s conditional eigen-
states to the maximal eigenvalue 1 − ε˜x as given by ex-
pression (67). Assume that we know the fidelity
〈βx|ρxB|βx〉 = 1− εx (C1)
of Bob’s received state ρxB with the coherent state |βx〉
is given. The amplitude βx is defined in Eq. (65). We
can express the conditional states ρxB in a natural basis
of displaced Fock-states {|φxk〉} = {D(βx)|k〉}. Here, the
the parameter k labels the photon number. Obviously,
|βx〉 = |φx0〉 holds. In this basis, ρxB reads
ρxB =

 a00 a01 ...a∗01 a11
...
. . .

 = V xDxV x† , (C2)
where V x denotes a unknown unitary matrix and Dx is
the representation of ρxB in its eigenbasis. Without loss
of generality, we can choose the first element in the D-
Matrix to correspond to the biggest eigenvalue, so that
Dx00 = 1− ε˜x . (C3)
From Eq. (C2), we know that
1− εx = a00 = |V x00|2Dx00 +
∞∑
k=1
|V x0k|2Dxkk (C4)
As V x is unitary, it follows that
∞∑
k=1
|V x0k|2 = 1− |V x00|2 . (C5)
Moreover, Dx is normalized, so that
∞∑
k=1
Dxkk = 1−Dx00 = ε˜x , (C6)
where we used Eq. (C3). This can be used to bound the
infinite sum in Eq. (C4) as
∞∑
k=1
|V x0k|2Dxkk ≤
(
1− |V x00|2
)
ε˜x , (C7)
since all terms |V x0k|2 and Dxkk appearing in the sum are
strictly positive. Therefore, we can bound Eq. (C4) ac-
cording to inequality (C7) as
1− εx ≤ |V x00|2 (1− ε˜x) +
(
1− |V x00|2
)
ε˜x
= |V x00|2 (1− 2ε˜x) + ε˜x .
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It follows that
|V x00|2 ≥
1− εx − ε˜x
1− 2ε˜x . (C8)
Moreover, one can use Eq. (C4) to obtain a lower bound
on |V x00|2 as
1− εx ≥ |V x00|2 (1− ε˜x) , (C9)
so that
|V x00|2 ≤
1− εx
1− ε˜x . (C10)
On the other hand, Bob’s conditional states can be writ-
ten as
ρ0B = V
0D0V 0
†
(C11)
ρ1B = UV
1D1V 1
†
U † ,
where the unitary operation U is given, up to an unim-
portant unimodular phase, by U = Dˆ
(
β1
)
Dˆ
(−β0) and
Dˆ denotes the displacement operator. Let us denote the
eigenvectors of Bob’s conditional states ρxB as {|β˜xl 〉} with
|β˜x〉 being the eigenstate corresponding to the biggest
eigenvalue 1 − ε˜x. With the representation (C11), these
states can be written as
|β˜0〉 = V 0|φ00〉 (C12)
|β˜1〉 = UV 1|φ00〉 ,
so that
〈β˜0|β˜1〉 =
∞∑
k,j=0
V 0k0
∗
UklV
1
l0 (C13)
By use of the triangle inequalities, one can construct an
upper bound as
∣∣∣〈β˜0|β˜1〉∣∣∣ ≤ |U00| ∣∣V 000∣∣ ∣∣V 100∣∣+ ∣∣V 000∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
l=1
U0lV
1
l0
∣∣∣∣∣ (C14)
+
∣∣V 100∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
k=1
Uk0V
0
k0
∗
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
k,l=1
V 0k0
∗
UklV
1
l0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
and a lower bound as
∣∣∣〈β˜0|β˜1〉∣∣∣ ≥ |U00| ∣∣V 000∣∣ ∣∣V 100∣∣− ∣∣V 000∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
l=1
U0lV
1
l0
∣∣∣∣∣ (C15)
− ∣∣V 100∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
k=1
Uk0V
0
k0
∗
∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
k,l=1
V 0k0
∗
UklV
1
l0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Upper bounds on the sums in Eqs.(C14) and (C15) can
be obtained by using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality as
∞∑
k=1
|Uk0|
∣∣V 0k0∣∣ ≤√1− |U00|2√1− |V 000|2 (C16)
∞∑
l=1
|U0l|
∣∣V 1l0∣∣ ≤√1− |U00|2√1− |V 100|2∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
k,l=1
V 0k0
∗
UklV
1
l0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
1− |V 000|2
√
1− |V 100|2 .
It is easy to see that |U00| = |〈β0|β1〉| := κ. Finally,
inserting Eqs. (C8, C10, C16) in Eq. (C14) yields
∣∣∣〈β˜0|β˜1〉∣∣∣ ≤κ√1− ε0
1− ε˜0
√
1− ε1
1− ε˜1 (C17)
+
√
1− κ2
√
1− ε0
1− ε˜0
√
ε1 − ε˜1
1− 2ε˜1
+
√
1− κ2
√
1− ε1
1− ε˜1
√
ε0 − ε˜0
1− 2ε˜0
+
√
ε1 − ε˜1
1− 2ε˜1
√
ε0 − ε˜0
1− 2ε˜0 .
Similarly, a lower bound can be obtained by Eqs. (C8,
C10, C16) and (C15) as
∣∣∣〈β˜0|β˜1〉∣∣∣ ≥κ
√
1− ε0 − ε˜0
1− 2ε˜0
√
1− ε1 − ε˜1
1− 2ε˜1 (C18)
−
√
1− κ2
√
1− ε0
1− ε˜0
√
ε1 − ε˜1
1− 2ε˜1
−
√
1− κ2
√
1− ε1
1− ε˜1
√
ε0 − ε˜0
1− 2ε˜0
−
√
ε1 − ε˜1
1− 2ε˜1
√
ε0 − ε˜0
1− 2ε˜0 .
The explicit expression for cl (ε˜x, εx, κ) is therefore given
by Eq. (C18) and respectively, cu (ε˜x, εx, κ) is given by
Eq. (C17).
APPENDIX D: ESTIMATION TO THE OVERLAP
OF EVE’S MAXIMAL EIGENSTATES
In the collective attack scenario, Eve’s attack can be
modelled by attaching an ancilla system to the signals
| ± α〉 and performing a unitary operation on the joint
system. As any unitary preserves the inner product, the
overlap |〈Ψ0BE |Ψ1BE〉| of the states after the interaction
is given by input overlap |〈−α|α〉|. This can be written
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as
|〈−α|α〉| = |〈Ψ0BE |Ψ1BE〉| (D1)
= |
√
(1− ε˜0)(1− ε˜1)〈β˜0|β˜1〉〈ε˜0|ε˜1〉
+
√
(1− ε˜0)ε˜1〈β˜0|〈ε˜0|ϕ1EB〉
+
√
(1− ε˜1)ε˜0〈ϕ0EB|β˜1〉|ε˜1〉
+
√
ε˜1ε˜0〈ϕ0EB |ϕ1EB〉|.
using decomposition (39), where |ϕxEB〉 is orthogonal to
|β˜x〉|ε˜x〉. This orthogonality can be used to construct the
inequalities
|〈ϕ0EB |ϕ1EB〉|2 + |〈ϕ0EB|β˜1〉|ε˜1〉|2 ≤ 1 (D2)
|〈ϕ0EB |ϕ1EB〉|2 + |〈β˜0|〈ε˜0|ϕ1EB〉|2 ≤ 1 .
We can estimate the last three terms of the right hand
side of Eq. (D1) using the triangle inequality and in-
equalities (D2) as
|
√
(1− ε˜0)ε˜1〈β˜0|〈ε˜0|ϕ1EB〉 (D3)
+
√
(1− ε˜1)ε˜0〈ϕ0EB|β˜1〉|ε˜1〉+
+
√
ε˜1ε˜0〈ϕ0EB |ϕ1EB〉|
≤
√
1− |〈ϕ0EB|ϕ1EB〉|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
x0
(√
(1− ε˜0)ε˜1 +
√
(1− ε˜1)ε˜0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
y0
+ |〈ϕ0EB |ϕ1EB〉|︸ ︷︷ ︸
x1
√
ε˜1ε˜0︸ ︷︷ ︸
y1
≤
√
[
√
(1− ε˜1)ε˜0 +
√
(1− ε˜0)ε˜1]2 + ε˜1ε˜0 .
In the sixth line we have use fact the that if
∑
i x
2
i =
1,
∑
i xiyi ≤
√∑
i y
2
i holds, which can easily derived
from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality of two vectors inR2.
From Eq. (D3) and Eq. (D1), we obtain
|〈β˜0|β˜1〉〈ε˜0|ε˜1〉|
≥
|〈−α|α〉| −
√
[
√
(1− ε˜1)ε˜0 +
√
(1− ε˜0)ε˜1]2 + ε˜1ε˜0√
(1 − ε˜0)(1− ε˜1)
.
and
|〈β˜0|β˜1〉〈ε˜0|ε˜1〉|
≤
|〈−α|α〉| +
√
[
√
(1− ε˜1)ε˜0 +
√
(1− ε˜0)ε˜1]2 + ε˜1ε˜0√
(1 − ε˜0)(1− ε˜1)
.
Finally, we obtain Eqs. (70-72) by inserting the extremal
values for the possible overlaps
∣∣∣〈β˜0|β˜1〉∣∣∣ of Bob’s max-
imal eigenstates given by Eq. (67) and the definition
γ := |〈ε˜0|ε˜1〉|.
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